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THE BECK DECISION: WILL IT DIVIDE
ENTERTAINMENT UNIONS?
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, it is commonplace to hear the argument that labor
unionism in the United States is dead or dying. The contention is not
that unions no longer wield any power,1 but only that their power in
American life has already reached its epoch and is now in inexorable
decline. A recent Supreme Court decision, Communications Workers of
America v. Beck,2 dealing with the power of labor unions to use dues for
"political purposes," does not assuage the fears of union leaders worried
about their ability to run their unions as they see fit. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, declared that in "agency shops," unions may
exact "only those fees and dues necessary to 'performing the duties of an
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on
labor management issues.' ""
Under current labor law, unions and employers may enter into
agreements whereby workers who choose not to join the union which
represents them must nevertheless pay union dues to support the bar-
gaining activities of the union.' In Beck,5 the Supreme Court held that
unions may use these fees of nonmembers solely for collective bargaining
purposes and may not spend them on political activities.6 In this way,
1. Witness the recent passage of legislation mandating that corporations must give notice
to workers before plants are shut down. It is an example of how unions can still lobby and win
in cases where the goal is sharply defined. Congress passed the bill despite President Reagan's
veto. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379
(1988).
2. - U.S. - (1988), 108 S. Ct. 2641.
3. Id. at 2657 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)).
4. This "agency shop" scheme is authorized by § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. The pertinent part of this section declares: "[N]othing in this Act... shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization... to require as a condition of
employment membership therein .... " Section 8(a)(3) goes on to state that:
no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-member-
ship in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such
membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973) [hereinafter NLRA]. Taken as a whole, the NLRA permits these
types of employment regimes to be contracted for by the employer and the union.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
6. Id. at 2657.
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the autonomy of the unions has been curtailed and their power reduced.
The Beck decision's resulting limits upon union expenditures of cer-
tain types of dues have especially affected the entertainment industry,
whose unions have already suffered deep declines in membership and in-
fluence in the last fifteen years. The Beck decision threatens to divide
entertainment unions upon economic lines because a majority of mem-
bers are frequently out of work while a minority command huge salaries.
Only time will tell whether union leaders in the entertainment industry
can avoid such a split.
FACTS
The Beck decision involved twenty individuals employed by various
Maryland subsidiaries of American Telephone and Telegraph ("AT&T")
and the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company ("C&P") who
chose not to become members of their union, the Communications
Workers of America ("CWA"). Under the contract between the CWA
and the employers, the workers who abstained from union membership
must still pay dues, designated as agency fees, to the Union or risk termi-
nation.7 The workers who chose not to join the Union filed suit in dis-
trict court, challenging the Union's use of their agency fees. The
workers alleged that the Union's use of these agency fees for purposes
such as the funding of pro-labor candidates, lobbying for pro-labor legis-
lation, encouraging the organization of other employees working for dif-
ferent employers, and the Union's participation in certain political
events, violated the CWA's duty of fair representation and the first
amendment. 9
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") au-
thorizes unions and employers to enter into contracts which contain pro-
visions mandating that every employee, desiring to be a member of the
union or not, pay full dues to the union if he is to remain employed.' °
The contracts commonly provide for termination of employees who re-
fuse to pay these agency fees."
In Beck, the workers contended that the law allowed for parties to
enforce the payment of agency fees for collective bargaining purposes
7. Id. at 2645.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (1973).
11. The United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld this provision of the NLRA
which expressly allows these types of contracts. See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734, 735 (1963); Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S.
407, 409 (1976).
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only. All workers, whether or not they chose to join the Union, would
pay the fees to insure that both members and nonmembers of the Union
supported the cost borne by the Union of negotiating labor agreements.'
2
Benefits won through negotiation by the Union were shared by all em-
ployees, not just those who chose to join the Union. Thus, the costs
should be equally shared as well. The nonunion workers did not object
to sharing this cost. The workers argued, however, that limits should
exist on how the unions may spend agency fees. 3 The workers viewed
the purpose of agency fees as solely that of subsidizing the expenses in-
curred by the Union in the negotiation of labor agreements. 4 According
to the workers, any use of agency fees beyond this narrow purpose vio-
lated both the NLRA and the United States Constitution.' 5
In opposition, the Union argued that when Congress drafted the
NLRA the regulation of union expenditures was debated but rejected. 1
6
Therefore, the Union argued that the legislation does not warrant an in-
terpretation restricting union expenditures of agency fees to collective
bargaining activities only. '7 Second, the Union contended that an earlier
decision, International Association of Machinists v. Street, 18 where the
Supreme Court held that a union may only use agency fees for political
purposes, not for collective bargaining, was not controlling because it
interpreted a different statute.19
The Court rejected the Union's arguments and held that the statute
interpreted in Street was controlling.' 0 Moreover, the Court failed to
conclude that Congress' earlier reluctance to limit union expenditures
foreclosed the courts from doing so in the future.2 ' While the Court
based its ruling on statutory interpretation, rather than questions of con-
stitutional rights, it nevertheless did not agree with the Union's statutory
argument. The result is a new set of limits on the spending of agency fees
by unions and a narrowing of union discretion on how to allocate
resources.
12. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2650.
13. Id. at 2645.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2654.
17. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2654.
18. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
19. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2653.
20. Id.
21. Id.
19891
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BACKGROUND
Beck turned primarily on the interpretation of two statutes: the
Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Both Acts
represent landmarks in labor history and an understanding of their back-
ground and meaning is crucial to put the present discussion in
perspective.
The Railway Labor Act ("RLA") was passed in 1926.22 The goal of
the Act was the peaceful settlement of labor disputes in the railroad in-
dustry.23 A board was established to settle contract and other disputes.24
Section 2 of the RLA prevents companies from interfering in the process
of union organization.25
The RLA was a precursor to the NLRA which was passed in
1935.26 The NLRA was vital to labor because, for the first time, legal
backing was given to the proposition that unions had the right to organ-
ize.27 Beyond that, the NLRA made the encouragement of union organi-
zation a goal of the federal government.2" Full support by the federal
government was a turning point in labor history because the government
previously had done little to encourage, and in fact did much to discour-
age, labor organization.29 Finally, the NLRA authorized the creation of
22. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1986).
23. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 755 (1961).
24. For example, the National Labor Relations Board rules on questions such as whether
an action by a union or an employer represents an unfair labor practice.
25. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1986). This provision was held constitutional in Texas & N.O.R. Co.
v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
26. When first passed in 1935, the NLRA was also known as the Wagner Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1973). The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Taft Hartley Act. 49 Stat. 449 (1973).
The amended version is sometimes known as the National Labor Relations Act, 1947. 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1973).
27. Section 7 of the original Wagner Act provided that "[e]mployees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1973).
28. Section 1 of the NLRA in pertinent part states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1973).
29. Police frequently broke up strike demonstrations and arrested union organizers. See
S. PERLMAN, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922).
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the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to settle labor disputes.3°
The most important provision of the NLRA, for purposes of this
note, is the right of unions to negotiate "closed shop" provisions with
employers. A "closed shop" means that all workers who worked for the
company or industry covered by the labor agreement had to join the
union and pay its dues.a' If the workers refused, they could not work;
otherwise many workers would abstain from joining the union and avoid
paying union dues, creating a "free rider" problem.32 At the same time,
however, the workers were free to enjoy the benefits of labor agreements
negotiated by the union. The advent of the closed shop resolved the free
rider problem.33
In the years between 1935 and 1947, before the amendments to the
NLRA were enacted, the ability of unions to negotiate closed shop agree-
ments with employers was criticized by those concerned with the rights
of free association.34 This criticism led Congress to modify some of the
provisions of the NLRA in the Taft Hartley Act." Taft Hartley was
bitterly opposed by labor because it prohibited many labor practices.36
For purposes of this note, however, the focus will be on Taft Hartley's
prohibition of the closed shop.
The provisions of the Taft Hartley Act evidence a recognition by
Congress of the problems created by the closed shop. In particular, Con-
gress recognized that the closed shop restricted the rights of workers to
associate freely with whom they chose.3" The free association issue had
led to frequent attacks on the closed shop in the years prior to the Taft
30. The creation of the National Labor Relations Board was authorized by 29 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1973).
31. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2649.
32. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the Court explained that,
"Congress recognized that in the absence of a union-security provision (i.e., the closed shop or
the agency shop) many employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish
like collective bargaining, will refuse to pay their fair share of the cost." Id. at 740-41.
33. Senator Taft declared in debate on the issue in Congress, "[Closed Shop] agreements
prevent nonunion workers from sharing in the benefits resulting from union activities without
also sharing in the obligations." Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2650 n.5.
34. Id. at 2650.
35. Id. The Taft Hartley Act was part of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1973).
36. Secondary boycotts as well as strikes to compel an employer to commit some unfair
labor practice such as discharging an employee for belonging to a particular union, were now
held to be "unfair labor practices" and illegal. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973).
37. Closed shops allowed the union to deny membership in the union for dubious reasons
and in some cases exact a price for membership beyond regular dues. Failure to join the union
allowed the union to demand that the employer fire the employee as this was part of all closed
shop agreements between unions and employers. See Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2661.
1989]
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Hartley Act.3" While Congress sought to curtail the problems associated
with the closed shop, it did not forget the countervailing free rider prob-
lem which resulted from open shops where union membership was
optional.
In an effort to solve problems inherent in both closed and open shop
agreements, Congress, through the Taft Hartley Act, allowed employers
and unions to enter into agreements containing what are termed "union
security agreements."3 9 These are also sometimes known as "agency
shop agreements."'  In an agency shop, employees are free to abstain
from union membership. At the same time, however, employees who
refuse to join the union must pay agency fees which are equivalent to
regular union dues.4' This was a compromise. Forcing every employee
to pay either regular dues or agency fees to the union resolved the "free
rider" problem. Unions received financial support from all workers
rather than allowing some workers to simply abstain from joining while
continuing to enjoy the contract benefits garnered through union negotia-
tion. Employees, however, were still free to abstain from actually joining
the union, thereby protecting their freedom of association. In 1951, Con-
gress amended the National Railroad Act, which had dictated labor rules
in railroads, to include the provision in the Taft Hartley Act allowing for
union security agreements.42 The intent of Congress in enacting the Taft
Hartley Act and the amendment to the National Railroad Act was the
major concern of the Supreme Court in Communications Workers of
America v. Beck
43
PRIOR RULINGS
The Supreme Court in Beck was not the first to address the issue of
the constitutionality of the agency shop. Beginning in 1956, the Court
attempted to draw the boundaries of union organization.
The first ruling in this area was Railway Employes' Department v.
Hanson." Hanson involved a railroad union and the application of spe-
cial railroad regulatory laws. The special importance of the railroad in-
dustry in the early United States economy 45 resulted in congressional
38. Id. at 2649-50.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973).
40. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2648.
41. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742-44 (1961).
42. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2649.
43. Id. at 2641.
44. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
45. The building of railroads was crucial for the early American economy for two reasons.
First, it provided for the transportation of raw material, finished goods and people to places
[Vol. 9
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attention almost from the beginning to prevent strikes in the railroad
industry that would literally shut down the newly industrializing
economy.
4 6
This special importance ascribed to the railroad industry resulted in
the Railroad Labor Act." The RLA, enacted in 1926, emphasized the
negotiated settlement of labor disputes.4" At the same time, however, no
part of the RLA required nonunion workers to contribute dues to the
union.4 9 This omission can be traced to the railroad industry's long his-
tory of "voluntary unionism. ' ° When Congress, through Taft-Hartley,
created the agency shop, the law did not affect the railroad industry be-
cause that industry was controlled by the RLA. Therefore, in an effort to
give railroad unions the same rights to compel contributions from work-
ers as authorized under the Taft Hartley Act, Congress amended the
RLA to allow for union security agreements.51
Hanson turned on the amended part of the RLA section 2, Eleventh
which authorized union security agreements. Workers who had chosen
not to join the Union, but who nevertheless paid agency fees, challenged
the Union's expenditure of those agency fees on noncollective bargaining
activities.5 2 The workers contended that the expenditure of agency fees
on noncollective bargaining activities violated both the first amendment
and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
5 3
where they were needed. Second, the need to construct the vast rail systems created great
demand for steel and helped build the American steel industry. See S. PERLMAN, HISTORY OF
TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922).
46. Street, 367 U.S. at 755-56 n.11.
47. Id. at 755.
48. Id.
49. See the Railroad Labor Act. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1986).
50. Street, 367 U.S. at 750.
51. The amended section 2, Eleventh provides in pertinent part:
Any carrier or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor
organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance
with the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted,
(A) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment,
that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective
date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members
of the labor organization representing their craft or class; Provided, that no such
agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to
whom membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are gener-
ally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom member-
ship was denied or terminated for any other reason other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including
fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining mem-
bership ....
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1986). See Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2649.
52. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236.
53. Id.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with the workers and held that the
creation of section 2, Eleventh of the RLA was a valid exercise of the
commerce power under the Constitution and that it did not violate the
first and fifth amendments.5 4 The majority refused to find that the Rail-
way Labor Act violated the Constitution without a showing that the
Union actually had or was engaging in political activities." In one pas-
sage the Hanson Court noted that it was not making a finding about bill
of rights violations.56 "If in a similar future case, the record showed that
agency shop workers were forced to contribute their agency fees to a
union which was contributing a substantial or even partial percentage of
their collected dues toward political purposes, this case would not be
controlling.""7
According to the Court, the trial court record in Hanson disclosed
no evidence showing the extent of union spending of agency fees on polit-
ical noncollective bargaining purposes.5" In other words, the workers in
Hanson made no showing of political expenditures by the Union. The
possibility that section 2, Eleventh of the RLA would have been uncon-
stitutional, had there been a showing of political activity by the Union,
was not foreclosed. In this way, the Supreme Court held merely that
section 2, Eleventh on its face did not violate the Constitution. Hanson
also held that agency shop agreements did not violate the Constitution
and were authorized by a valid congressional exercise of the commerce
clause. 59
On the heels of Hanson came International Association of Machinists
v. Street. " The facts of Street were similar to those in Hanson. A group
of disgruntled railroad companies and their employees who had chosen
not to enter their unions sued a group of labor organizations. The unions
were accused of using the agency fees paid by these nonunion employees
on both political campaigns of pro-labor candidates and other political
causes on which the nonunion employees disagreed.6"
However similar the two cases were, Street differed from Hanson in
two respects. First, the record in Street included clear examples of polit-
ical activity by the union and this issue was not disputed.62 The record in
54. Id. at 238.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
61. Id. at 768-69.
62. The trial court found clear evidence of political expenditures by the union. "Examples
[Vol. 9
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Hanson, however, showed no evidence of such political activity.6 3 Sec-
ond, workers did not challenge the constitutionality of section 2, Elev-
enth of the RLA on its face in Street. Rather, the workers who paid the
agency fees in Street argued that the RLA violated the United States
Constitution "as applied to infringe the particularized constitutional
rights of any individual."" These differences account for the different
outcomes.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Street, scanned the legis-
lative history of section 2, Eleventh of the RLA in an attempt to assess
the workers' argument that the RLA did not allow for the spending of
agency fees for political purposes. The history seemed only to show a
desire by Congress to force all workers, whether they joined the union or
not, to help pay for the costs of negotiating a labor contract.65 Agreeing
with the workers' argument, he stated: "[O]ne looks in vain for any sug-
gestion that Congress also meant in section 2, Eleventh to provide the
unions with a means for forcing employees over their objection, to sup-
port political causes which they oppose."' 66 For this reason, the Court
held that such political expenditures of agency fees by the unions was a
violation of the statute.67
In Beck, the Supreme Court held that the Street decision was con-
trolling and that it stood for the proposition that agency fees could only
be used to support collective bargaining.68 However, several decisions
prior to Beck suggest other interpretations of the Street decision. Per-
haps the most notable of the circuit court decisions interpreting Street
was Price v. International Union.69 In Price, nonunion workers chal-
lenged the expenditure of agency fees by the Union on political noncol-
lective bargaining purposes. The main contention of the workers in Price
was that the Union's political spending violated their right to be repre-
sented fairly by the Union. °
include funds contributed to support the campaigns of candidates for the offices of President
and Vice President of the United States, and for the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States." Street, 367 U.S. at 744 n.2.
63. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
64. Street, 367 U.S. at 748.
65. Id at 763-64.
66. Id. at 764.
67. Id. at 768-69.
68. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2657.
69. 795 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988).
70. Id. at 1130. The duty of a union to fairly represent its members was held to exist for
railroad unions in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The Court
in that case stated that "[s]o long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representa-
tive of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power
of representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft union." Id
1989]
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The court, however, disagreed with the workers' claim and held that
the Union's duty of fair representation extended only to matters where
the Union served as the workers' sole representative. 71 The court ex-
plained that matters of union expenditures involved only the Union and
the workers and not the employer.72 Therefore, the issue of union ex-
penditures did not involve the Union acting as the workers' representa-
tive in negotiations with the employer. 7' Rather, the Union's spending of
dues was simply an internal matter between the workers and their repre-
sentatives.74 For this reason, no duty of fair representation arose in the
case.75 The workers disagreed and asserted that the employer was in-
volved to the extent that failure to pay the agency fees, which they
viewed as unfair, would result in the firing of the worker as authorized by
the union security clause setting up the agency shop.76
These contentions failed to convince the court. Even if a duty of fair
representation did exist, the court did not believe that the Union violated
its duty.77 The case turned on the amount of evidence required by the
court. According to the court, in order to show that the Union breached
its duty of fair representation, the workers must show that "the union
acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith either in negotiating,
executing, or enforcing the security clause, or in spending the resultant
funds."
78
By its application of the tests, the court examined the expenditures
not related directly to collective bargaining and concluded that such
spending was not arbitrary or irrational, but represented regular union
spending.79 Additionally, the court concluded that the expenditures
were not motivated by any "discriminatory animus," and that the work-
ers were in fact not being treated any differently than regular dues-paying
members of the Union, but rather were being treated the same."' The
nonunion workers contended that they should be treated differently be-
at 204. The same duty was held to exist for nonrailroad unions in United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 1060
(1968). See also Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
71. Price, 795 F.2d at 1134.
72. Id. at 1135.
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Id.
76. Price, 795 F.2d at 1135.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court pointed to "expenditures on organization and recruitment, insurance
plans, strike funds, scholarship funds, union publications, and litigation unrelated to collective
bargaining." Price, 795 F.2d at 1135.
80. Id. at 1136.
[Vol. 9
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cause they disagreed with those who joined the Union voluntarily."1 The
court, reasoning that treating people alike did not constitute discrimina-
tion, held against the workers and found that the Union did not breach
its duty of fair representation.82
By applying the test this way, the court turned the duty of fair rep-
resentation on its head, suggesting that the workers desired unequal rep-
resentation. This finding of no discrimination is not without merit and
seems to make sense if both the regular union members and the agency
fee paying nonmembers are viewed alike. However, an argument can be
made that they are not alike and deserve different but fair representation.
The outcome in Price can be viewed as simply the result of the manner in
which the workers presented their arguments. The workers claimed that
the intent and meaning of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA was equivalent to
section 2, Eleventh of the RLA in that violations of either section repre-
sented state action, and not just agreements between private parties
which could not be remedied by any court.83 The Price court found that
state violation of the statutes did not constitute state action thereby chal-
lenging the equivalency of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and section 2,
Eleventh of the RLA.84
THE Beck DECISION
In many ways, the Beck decision is much less complicated than its
progeny. Difficult and convoluted theories about state action and "inter-
nal" versus "external" matters were eschewed for a more simple analysis
of statutory interpretation.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Beck, the case was subject to
three lower court decisions, including a district court decision, an appel-
late court decision and a rehearing by an en banc court.
The Beck case involved twenty employees of various telephone com-
panies who chose not to become members of their union, the CWA. The
essence of the suit was that CWA's use of the agency fees for noncollec-
tive bargaining purposes violated the CWA's duty of fair representation
as well as the first amendment.8
By spending agency fees for purposes other than collective bargain-
ing, the Union was forcing nonmembers of the Union to support activi-
ties beyond collective bargaining. Workers who did not wish to join their
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Id. at 1130-31.
84. Price, 795 F.2d at 1131.
85. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2641, 2645.
1989]
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industry's union were forced to pay for political activities as well as col-
lective bargaining expenses. These political activities may represent the
very aspect of unions to which agency fee paying workers objected. Yet,
by allowing unions to spend agency fees on political activities, the nonun-
ion workers were in essence supporting the activities which kept them
from joining the Union.
The workers sought, in addition to declaratory relief, an injunction
barring petitioners from exacting fees exceeding the amount necessary to
carry out collective bargaining, as well as damages for the past collection
of such excess fees.86
The district court held that the CWA could not spend a substantial
portion of the agency fees it collected from nonunion member workers
for purposes other than that allocable to "collective bargaining, contract
administration and grievance adjustment."87 Such expenditures repre-
sented a violation of the workers' first amendment rights of free speech
and association. 8 In accordance with that ruling, the court forbade fu-
ture collections of agency fees in excess of the amount needed for collec-
tive bargaining purposes.89 The court then ordered the parties to agree
on a percentage which corresponded to the portion of the fees CWA had
allocated to noncollective bargaining purposes.9° When the Union could
not show, clearly and convincingly, that more than twenty-one percent of
the agency fees had been spent on collective bargaining, the court or-
dered a refund to the workers.91 Under the ruling, the CWA was to re-
fund all agency fees it had collected since 1976 which exceeded the
amount necessary for collective bargaining to the workers who had paid
them.92 In addition, the court ordered the CWA to keep adequate
records in the future showing a division between expenditures for collec-
tive bargaining and expenditures for other purposes.9 3
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, a divided panel upheld the district court's ruling of relief to the
workers.94 Unlike the lower court, however, the appellate court refused
to grant relief under the first amendment.95 Rather than finding a viola-
86. Id. at 2645.
87. Beck, 468 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D. Md. 1979) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 225-26, 232, 235-36 (1977)).
88. Id. at 96.
89. Id. at 97.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Beck, 468 F. Supp. at 97.
93. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2646 (citing petition for cert. 1 19a).
94. Beck v. Communications Workers of Am., 800 F.2d 1280, 1291 (4th Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 1283.
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tion of the Constitution, the appellate court held that the Union expendi-
tures of agency fees for noncollective bargaining purposes was a violation
of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.96 A majority of the panel also found
that the lower court's use of a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
was in error.97 However, because many of the union expenditures were
indisputably used for noncollective bargaining purposes, the error was
harmless. 98 The majority then remanded the case to determine the
proper allocation between proper and improper expenditure of the re-
maining agency fees collected by CWA but not specifically determined in
the appellate decision. 99 By a six to four vote, the en banc court affirmed
the allocations by the appeals court."°°
In the Supreme Court decision, Justice Brennan relied on Street.'0 '
As previously discussed, the Street Court held that the expenditure of
agency fees by certain railroad unions for political noncollective bargain-
ing purposes was a violation of section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor
Act. 0 2 The RLA had been amended to allow for union security agree-
ments which set up the agency shop and made the closed shop illegal."0 3
The main question to be answered in the Court's statutory interpretation
was whether the decision in Street, which involved the RLA, was con-
trolling in a case that involved a nonrailroad union, such as the CWA. "
The Court indicated that for the purposes of agency fee expenditures, the
statutes were equivalent.
10 5
Justice Brennan stated that the passage of the amendment to the
RLA, which occurred after the Taft Hartley amendment, was intended
to mirror the Taft Hartley Act in the creation of the agency shop.' 0 6
Both statutes simply sought to end the abuses associated with the closed
shop. 10 7 Each statute drew a middle course ending the free rider prob-
lem but allowing for a degree of freedom by workers to abstain from
96. Id.
97. Beck v. Communications Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1209-10 (4th Cir. 1985),
aff'd on rehearing 800 F.2d 1280 (1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988).
98. Id. at 1211.
99. Beck v. Communications Workers of Am., 800 F.2d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988) (en banc).
100. Id. at 1288.
101. Beck 108 S. Ct. at 2648.
102. Beck, 800 F.2d 1288. The court also vacated certain jurisdictional holdings that are
unimportant for this discussion.
103. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1983).
104. The CWA was controlled by 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973).
105. Street, 367 U.S. at 768-69.
106. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2649.
107. Id.
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union membership."°8
The Court gave particular attention to a purported "Bill of Rights
for Union Members" which was to accompany section 8(a)(3) and which
would have set limits on the types of expenditures for which a union
could spend its collected dues.19 Congress rejected the legislation.'1 ° In
turn, the unions interpreted Congress' rejection as a sign of reticence to
regulate union expenditures."' In this way, the Union argued that sec-
tion 8(a)(3) did not intend to limit the ability of unions to choose how to
spend agency fees. 1 2 Justice Brennan rejected the argument because the
legislation was directed solely at full union members rather than agency
fee paying nonmembers.' 13 Little evidence, however, suggests such a
narrow purpose of the bill of rights legislation. Justice Brennan reads
distinctions into the bill through an overly literal interpretation.
The Court places exaggerated weight on other legislative history as
well. For example, Justice Brennan cites statements made by Senator
Taft during legislative debate to demonstrate the intent of section 2,
Eleventh to exactly mirror section 8(a)(3)." 4 Senator Taft declared that
the amendment to the RLA "inserts in the railway mediation law almost
the exact provisions, so far as they fit, of the Taft Hartley law .... 1,5
Yet, the sentence is merely one in a lengthy debate that included other
contradictory statements.' 1 6 In addition, Congress attempted to regulate
union fees. In a provision not mentioned by the Court, Congress adopted
a section of the Taft Hartley Act which limited union expenditures on
federal elections. 17 Thus, if Congress had intended to limit or regulate
union expenditures further, they would have. The fact that Congress did
regulate them, but only in a narrow way, demonstrates that it did not
108. Id. at 2657.
109. Id. at 2654.
110. Id.
111. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2655.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2654-55.
115. Id. at 2651.
116. Senator Taft stated: "The great difference [between the closed shop and the union
shop], is that [under the union shop] a man can get a job without joining the union or asking
favors of the union.... The fact that the employee has to pay dues to the union seems to me to
be much less important." Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2656 (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 4886 (1947)). The
statement shows that the intent of § 8(a)(3) was to have nonunion workers pay dues to the
union. By union dues, it is arguable that the Senator meant full union dues.
117. In section 304 of the Taft Hartley Act, which is now incorporated into the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1976, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, Congress made it unlawful for a union "to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with certain political elections, primaries or
political conventions." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1973).
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intend to regulate them any further. Yet, Justice Brennan dismissed this
argument without hesitation." 8
These flaws in reasoning are important for they point to a desire to
shape the facts narrowly to a predetermined opinion. Another problem
in the Beck decision that was never raised in Beck or in any previous
cases agreeing with Beck, relates to the definition of political noncollec-
tive bargaining expenditures. The Court treated this term as almost self-
explanatory" 9 and yet the term is vague at best. The failure to ade-
quately define political activities is problematic. Is the investment of
pension funds in South Africa a political expenditure or solely an eco-
nomic one? Must union publications be totally devoid of political con-
tent or is the inclusion of an editorial opinion section an infringement on
first and fifth amendment rights of agency shop workers? If we narrowly
construe the distinction, all expenditures not directly related to collective
bargaining will be illegal.
Therefore, spending money on union publications, union insurance
plans, strike funds, and scholarship funds might be considered illegal
since they do not relate directly to collective bargaining. Yet, can these
expenditures be considered political? They are arguably merely benefits
offered to union members which may not be available through the em-
ployer. In addition, strike funds are crucial to a union's bargaining
power in the time of a strike. Without such a fund, it is doubtful that a
union could galvanize its members for a strike of any duration. In labor
negotiations, the appearance by a union of willingness to go on strike
indefinitely can be crucial to convincing an employer not to force a
strike. Thus, however political, many union expenditures are integral to
a union's survival. Moreover, such expenditures are not discriminatory
since they benefit nonmembers as much as members and are not political.
The problem is simply a matter of degree and the Court has done
little to draw boundaries as to which type of expenditure is valid and
which is not. The weakness is most clearly shown in the Court's descrip-
tion of every noncollective bargaining expenditure as somehow violating
the rights of nonmembers when many, if not all, of these expenditures are
simply aimed at benefiting both members and nonmembers alike through
such programs as group insurance and scholarship funds. However, the
majority in Beck is not the only culprit. The issue of how to define polit-
ical spending was not raised in prior decisions either. There can be little
doubt that this vague definition will be the subject of future litigation.
118. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2655.
119. Id. at 2657.
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Beck's Effect on the Entertainment Industry
Had Beck been decided ten to fifteen years earlier, the decision's
effect on the entertainment industry would have had much more import.
In past years, almost the entire entertainment industry was unionized.
20
In order to work for any of the major studios or television networks, a
potential employee had to become a member of the union representing
that particular entertainment field. 12' Before 1976, almost eighty percent
of the entertainment industry was unionized. 22 Agency shop agree-
ments were in effect throughout the industry. 23 As the power of craft
unions waned in the last decade, so has that of the entertainment
unions. 124
Every significant field in the entertainment industry is still union-
ized. 12 ' The difference now is that unions are only part of the employ-
ment picture and for the most part, one need not join a union to work in
many of the industries that make up the entertainment field.' 26 For ex-
ample, in years past, the whole extra field was unionized, so that all pro-
ducers came to the union to hire extras and the extras were paid on a
union scale. 127 Since then, only twenty percent of the extras remain
union members. Although they are paid up to twice as much as nonun-
ion extras,' 28 little of the work is supplied by workers who are members
of any union. This lack of union control of the industry exists in many of
the other fields, such as make-up artists and technicians.'2 9 Therefore,
because it applies only to unions, the Beck decision has little relevance
for those aspects of the entertainment industry where union influence is
negligible.
The erosion of union power in the industry has escaped some areas.
One union, in particular, which is greatly affected by Beck, is American
Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA"). According to a
Union representative, the Union is very concerned about the potential of
120. Telephone interview with Pam Fair, Publicity Representative for American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA") (Nov. 6, 1988).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Telephone interview with Pam Fair, supra note 120.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Eighty dollars per day plus expenses for union members as compared with less than
forty dollars per day for the average nonunion extra, according to the Screen Actors Guild.
Id.
129. Telephone interview with Pam Fair, supra note 120.
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the Beck decision to erode the power and influence of the Union. 3 0 AF-
TRA has a union security agreement with the networks and producers it
deals with. 13' Thus, to get a job as a radio or television artist, it is neces-
sary to join the Union. 132 At the same time, an employee may elect to
simply pay agency fees and remain a nonmember of the Union through
the union security agreement.
33
Entertainment unions have exhibited many examples of political ac-
tivity which the Beck decision would forbid if partially paid for through
agency fees. The unions view the election by workers not to join the
union and to keep the union accountable as a major threat. 134 The threat
is particularly dangerous because of the great percentage of unemployed
artists that comprise the union at any one time. 3 5 The temptation to
many AFTRA members to go on financial core status, as it is called
when a member elects to remain a nonmember and pay agency fees, is
great in an industry where work is relatively scarce. Prior to Beck,
agency fees were the same as regular union dues. 136 Now, however,
agency fees could presumedly be less because they would comprise only
those costs necessary for collective bargaining. In contrast, regular union
dues would continue to be made up of both costs for collective bargaining
as well as political causes financially suppported by the union.
Although few have chosen to go on financial core status, one promi-
nent member of AFTRA did. Bruce Herschensohn of Los Angeles TV
Station KABC's "Eyewitness News" chose to declare his new found sta-
tus live on television during a political commentary in which he hailed
the Beck decision as a victory for freedom of association. 37 This public
declaration of financial core status deeply worries AFTRA officials who
wonder whether allowing members to choose such status is even worth
the problems such status creates.' 38 Allowing some members to pay less
could create divisions and resentment within the union. Perhaps it
would be more advantageous to simply oust members who refuse to pay
normal dues rather than become financially accountable for every expen-
diture they make.' 39 But is such a move constitutional? If an industry
130. Id
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Telephone interview with Pam Fair, supra note 120.
135. Id.
136. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2645.
137. KABC Los Angeles, Channel 7, Eyewitness News, Aug. 8, 1988.
138. Telephone interview with Pam Fair, supra note 120.
139. Id.
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becomes totally unionized so that no one may work in the industry with-
out being a member of the union, ousting a member would be equivalent
to barring the former union member from ever working in his chosen
field. This closed shop is exactly what the Taft Hartley legislation was
meant to stop. Even more important, would ousting "core status mem-
bers" divide the union along financial lines increasing the power of pro-
ducers? Questions such as these are only beginning to surface.
Thus, even though most of the entertainment industry is not domi-
nated by unions, the parts that still are seem particularly vulnerable to
challenges by agency fee paying members. Such vulnerability stems from
duality of both high unemployment and a high degree of political activity
traditionally associated with entertainment unions. How the entertain-
ment unions will react to the Beck decision is not known at this time.
What is known is that they are worried, especially when high profile
members publicly hail the Supreme Court ruling in Beck on live televi-
sion. If the unions choose to drop members who choose such financial
core status, the tactic could snowball and membership could drop dra-
matically. Yet, if they allow members to choose such status after Beck,
the union may become financially accountable to a few members on how
their agency fees may be spent. In the end, such accountability could be
more trouble than it is worth.
CONCLUSION
Congress was reasonable and rational in attempting to solve the
problems of the closed shop in the late 1940s. The authorization of the
union shop was an attempt to insure freedom of association while at the
same time preventing free riders from receiving the benefits of union ne-
gotiated contracts without helping pay for their costs." As the majority
stated in Street: "compelling an individual to become a member of an
organization with political aspects is an infringement of the constitu-
tional freedom of association, whatever may be the constitutionality of
compulsory financial support of group activities outside the political pro-
cess."' 141 The agency shop forced workers to support union bargaining
activities which resulted in benefits to all workers, whether or not they
were members of the union. At the same time, however, by allowing
workers not to join the union, union shop agreements guarded the rights
of free association guaranteed by the first amendment. The approach
was admittedly a compromise between competing interests.
140. Beck, 108 S. Ct. at 2650.
141. Street, 367 U.S. at 747.
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Yet in reaching for that middle ground, Congress did not adequately
define the limits of union expenditures of agency fees, possibly believing
that such defined limits were unnecessary. The Beck decision is a realiza-
tion that limits are in fact necessary and that the limit is when an expen-
diture is made for political purposes. Beyond that realization, however,
Beck fails to clearly define those limits. The Court is satisfied to merely
describe the limits as political noncollective bargaining expenditures. In
this way, the Court does little to remedy the present situation. More-
over, the Court arrives at its conclusion by reading the statute far too
literally and placing undeserved emphasis on a few statements by Senator
Taft.
In addition, as demonstrated by its initial effect on entertainment
unions, the decision threatens to undermine the cohesiveness of certain
unions whose members are sharply divided in annual earnings. The re-
sult is a problem for the entertainment unions, which are now faced with
the possibility of the evolution of two separate union constituencies:
those who can afford to pay only the lower agency fees and those who
choose or can readily afford to pay for political expenditures by the
union.
When and if an alteration or modification of Beck occurs, the Court
must strive to consider the delicate balance of policy considerations
which make up the labor code.' 42 Although Beck dealt a serious and
perhaps crippling blow to the agency shop, the Court need not restore in
full a union's right to spend agency fees in any manner the union desires.
Rather, the Court should clarify exactly what type of expenditures would
constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3). This analysis should include a
clear definition of a political expenditure and what in the nature of such
an expenditure violates the rights of agency fee paying workers. More-
over, the Court should not attempt to set out the parameters by means of
a list, exhaustive or otherwise, of examples of "political expenditures."
The analysis should merely be clearer and more definitive than in Beck.
Without such a clarification, the law in this area leaves the unions guess-
ing. Such vagueness leads to a misunderstanding of the law and inevita-
bly more litigation.
The Beck decision is important because for the first time limits are
being placed on the agency shop. Some type of limits were overdue. The
Court however, as often happens with important decisions, reached too
far with too little analysis. With time, the decision can be clarified and
142. The main policies to weigh are the need to prevent free riders from exploiting union
negotiated benefits without paying for them and at the same time maintain a sensitivity to the
problem of agency fees going toward purposes which violate the rights of free association.
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moderated to better take into account the real concerns of both unions
and nonunion member workers.
Brian E. Cooper
